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Giving Kids Their Due: Theorizing a 
Modern Fourteenth Amendment 
Framework for Juvenile Defense 
Representation 
Mae C. Quinn 
ABSTRACT: This Essay advocates expansion of the right to and role of 
juvenile-defense counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated by 
the Supreme Court in In re Gault. It makes this move in light of the 
evolution of juvenile-court practices over time and modern understandings 
of adolescent development principles. In doing so it takes a different 
approach than many advocates and academics who have called for greater 
reliance on the concepts established in Gideon v. Wainwright and its 
progeny, relating to the right to and role of counsel in adult-criminal 
proceedings. Instead it suggests that standards of representation for 
juveniles must move beyond the limited “critical stage” and “offense-
focused” analyses used under right-to-counsel doctrines that have evolved 
under the Sixth Amendment for accused adults. 
Given that many facets of juvenile-court prosecutions allow for largely 
unchecked discretionary action by judges and court-related actors—both 
before and after adjudication—it rejects a trial-centered defense framework 
for effective juvenile representation. These ancillary parts of the process, too 
frequently below the law and lawyering radar, have the capacity to threaten 
youthful privacy, autonomy, and liberty more than a finding of guilt itself. 
And given what we now know about the capacities of young people to 
process information and make future-based decisions, the guiding hand of 
counsel is essential for the entire time a young person is involved with the 
juvenile justice system’s web. 
Accordingly, this Essay urges revisiting and re-envisioning the right and 
role of juvenile counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than 
repeatedly mining the Sixth Amendment to establish a more robust 
 
             Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. Many thanks to the law student 
organizers of this important Symposium, including Kate Rahel, and their faculty advisor, 
Professor James Tomkovicz. I am also grateful to my research assistants Jessica Albert, Claire 
Botnick, John Laughlin, and Meredith Schlacter for their contributions to this project. 
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conception of effective juvenile-court representation. Armed with recent 
findings about adolescent development and competence, and in light of the 
unique nature of such proceedings as they have evolved over time, we should 
fundamentally reconsider lawyer competence within juvenile prosecutions to 
ensure greater justice—both procedural and substantive—for court-involved 
youth. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly fifty years, clients, courts, and commentators have grappled 
with the right to, and role of, juvenile-defense counsel in this country. When 
the Supreme Court decided In re Gault in 1967, it provided youths facing 
charges in juvenile court with a constitutional right to representation.1 It 
also gave young people a range of additional constitutional trial rights, 
including timely notice of the charges, the ability to remain silent in the face 
of accusation, and to cross examine any witnesses against them. 
The Court handed down Gault just four years after it decided Gideon v. 
Wainwright2—the landmark decision affording the right to counsel to adults 
accused of crimes. But it did not rely directly upon the Sixth Amendment to 
support its decision to extend the right of representation in juvenile 
prosecutions. Instead, unlike Gideon, Gault looked to the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause for deciding when and what kind 
of representation juvenile courts must provide to youth facing accusations. 
Over the years, scholars and others have both celebrated and lamented 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gault. It has been cited as an important 
part of the Warren Court’s due process “revolution.” But it has also been 
criticized as too stingy in the list of protections it provided to court-involved 
youth. Many detractors have argued that the Court should have more fully 
incorporated the Bill of Rights within juvenile-court proceedings—as was 
done for accused adults. 
In particular, academics and advocates have faulted Gault for failing to 
tap into the Sixth Amendment and its protections. They have repeatedly 
urged greater reliance on criminal court right-to-counsel principles to more 
fully protect accused youth against substandard representation and serve as 
a bulwark against systemic injustice in our juvenile courts. This call has been 
renewed and reinvigorated in recent years—particularly given juvenile 
courts’ ever expanding reach, more punitive treatment of youth, and 
disproportionately negative impact on communities of color. 
But this Essay argues our current adult-criminal-justice system and its 
provision of appointed counsel are nothing to celebrate—much less 
replicate—in the juvenile-justice system. This is especially true if we are 
interested in reducing lived injustice for, and improving the life chances of, 
vulnerable youth of color. Instead, particularly given what we now know 
about the unique nature of both juveniles and juvenile prosecutions, this 
paper takes a different tack. Modern understandings of young people, their 
ability to understand juvenile-court processes, and our own adult 
understanding that juvenile proceedings are becoming ever more complex 
and less trial-focused in nature, militate in favor of a more modern and 
nuanced approach to the right and role of juvenile-defense counsel. 
 
 1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–42 (1967). 
 2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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It is true that there has been some doctrinal expansion of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in recent years, for instance, to encompass 
advice relating to collateral consequences of adult convictions.3 But there 
has been backsliding too. More than this, adult-criminal representation has 
been largely analyzed as a charge-specific event that does not attach until the 
formal prosecutorial process has begun, and is to be afforded in thinly sliced 
portions consistent with those stages of the criminal process that are seen as 
“critical.” 
These doctrines are not sufficiently malleable or robust to provide for 
meaningful representation for young persons who find themselves involved 
in our more fluid and far-reaching juvenile-justice system. Their legal needs 
are more than event- or charge-specific. Indeed, in many states, juvenile 
cases continually unfold and grow over many years based upon the 
discretionary nature of juvenile-court processes. And a few juvenile 
prosecutions actually result in trial on the merits. Instead, youth are more 
frequently impacted by pretrial intake and detention processes, dispositional 
determinations, post-dispositional placement reviews, and aftercare 
requirements.4 Thus a deeper and more holistic understanding of effective 
assistance of counsel—one that encompasses all phases of our modern 
juvenile-court process—is essential at this time. 
Contrary to many advocates and scholars, this Essay argues that a return 
to the more pliable and potentially more expansive fundamental fairness 
principles espoused by the Fourteenth Amendment may be what is necessary 
to further infuse juvenile-court proceedings with meaningful legal and 
lawyering standards. 
Part II begins by recounting how the right to counsel for juveniles was 
first established in Gault under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. It notes that Gault, decided four years after Gideon, stood in stark 
contrast to Gideon v. Wainwright, which expressly extended Sixth 
Amendment right-to-counsel protections to accused adults in the state court 
system. At the time both were heralded as landmark decisions that would 
likely change justice systems around the country for the better. 
Over the last five decades, Gault has been described as a great 
disappointment.5 Given the expanding reach of our juvenile-court systems, 
the punishments being imposed in such venues, and their 
disproportionately negative impact on children of color, many wonder what 
Gault actually accomplished. In particular, juvenile advocates have 
repeatedly decried Gault’s seemingly restrictive Fourteenth Amendment 
framework and faulted the Court’s failure to analyze the right to and role of 
juvenile-defense counsel through a Gideon Sixth Amendment prism. They 
 
 3. See infra Part IV.A. 
 4. See infra Part V.A. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
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claim such a reading, despite Gault’s clear Fourteenth Amendment basis, 
could have provided for improved protections and representation for 
youth—particularly poor youth of color. Legal scholarship has renewed and 
reenergized these arguments in recent years. Many are again calling for 
courts to revisit the juvenile right to counsel and infuse it with greater adult-
like criminal protections as a way to improve the juvenile-justice system. 
Part IV begins to respond to such calls by offering a somewhat different 
narrative about the right to criminal-defense counsel post-Gideon. It points 
out that Gideon itself has not delivered on its promises—as a matter of 
doctrine or in practice. Doctrinally, our right-to-counsel rules have provided 
very limited sources of protection. Both offense-specific rules and critical-
stage analyses, now dominant rules under the Sixth Amendment, provide for 
little more than piece-meal protections. 
As for court practices, front-page newspaper headlines inform the world 
that the right to counsel in American criminal courts is illusory at best.6 
Limited funds, overwhelming cases loads, modern “problem-solving” courts, 
and “debtors prison” practices are working to gut Gideon’s potential. And the 
thousands of young Black males publically lined up outside of our criminal 
courthouses each day demonstrate that the Sixth Amendment has done little 
to blunt racial bias in criminal proceedings. 
Given this contemporary context, Part V goes on to challenge efforts to 
treat youth the same as adults under the Sixth Amendment. As noted, Sixth 
Amendment doctrine and procedures provide a bright-line, formalistic form 
of representation for accused adults. Such practices are fundamentally at 
odds with the more fluid and amorphous components of juvenile-court 
proceedings. Similarly, modern social-science data has demonstrated 
youthful defendants are far from older defendants in their capacity to 
comprehend and make long-term decisions—thus they require different 
legal representation and protection standards than those provided for 
adults. 
In light of our criminal-justice system failings, as well as these 
differences between juvenile and criminal courts—in both the individuals 
being represented and the proceedings in which they find themselves—Part 
VI suggests that it might be time to revisit and reconsider the reach of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It may be possible to further mine due process’s 
depths to establish a more meaningful framework for the right to and role 
of counsel in juvenile-court proceedings. Returning to the Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis applied in Gault, contemporary evaluation of 
representational rights would take account of expert opinions and modern 
best practices. 
Thus this Essay calls for an expansive constitutional conception of 
juvenile-defense lawyering—one that moves beyond the specific offense 
 
 6. See infra Part IV.B. 
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charged and narrowly framed stages of the process and looks to modern 
evolving juvenile-justice standards for guidance. That is, to counter the ways 
in which juvenile-court actors increasingly encroach upon the lives and 
futures of still evolving youthful defendants, the right and role of counsel 
must be similarly rich, responsive, and evolutionary. 
II. GAULT  VS. GIDEON DEFENSE COUNSEL: DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
The facts of In re Gault 7 are so deeply entrenched in our collective legal 
recollection that they hardly need repeating. Young Gerald Gault, just 
fifteen years old, was summarily adjudicated for allegedly making “lewd” 
telephone calls to his neighbor, Mrs. Cook.8 Without being served with a 
written factual basis for the charges, presented with testimony from the 
complainant, informed of the right to remain silent, or—most importantly 
for purposes of this Essay—provided with an attorney to defend him at trial, 
he was found to be delinquent by a local juvenile-court judge and 
committed to the Arizona State Industrial School until the age of twenty-
one.9 
Before the United States Supreme Court, Gault argued that his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution had been violated.10 
That is, Gault argued that he was denied due process of law because he was 
found guilty and removed from his home based on allegations of 
wrongdoing without being provided with notice of the charges, the right to 
confrontation and against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel.11 The 
Court, in a landmark decision that took juvenile courts to task for their 
extreme informality and misguided paternalism,12 held that Gault was 
entitled to far more under the Fourteenth Amendment.13 
As for what “more” meant, the Court declared that “neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”14 Thus, 
when addressing testimonial rights and protections, the Gault Court 
expressly relied upon criminal cases that extended the Bill of Rights to the 
states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 Just as the right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment was applicable to state criminal 
proceedings by way of the Fourteenth Amendment,16 the Gault Court held 
 
 7. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 8. Id. at 4–5. 
 9. Id. at 5–10. 
 10. Id. at 10–14. 
 11. See generally id. 
 12. Id. at 12–31. 
 13. Id. at 30–31.  
 14. Id. at 13. 
 15. Id. at 42–57. 
 16. Id. at 47. 
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the same rule applied to juveniles—even if juvenile-court proceedings might 
be technically characterized as civil rather than criminal.17 
But somewhat surprisingly, in analyzing Gault’s other challenges, the 
Court relied exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment to extend relief.18 
Perhaps most strikingly, the Court applied this analysis to Gault’s right to 
representation claim; it did not look to the Bill of Rights and the express 
provisions of the Sixth Amendment, as in criminal cases, to define the right 
to, and role of, counsel.19 The Court relied solely upon the more malleable 
and less clearly established contours of the Due Process Clause to afford 
accused youthful offenders the protection of the “guiding hand of 
counsel.”20 
Notably, the Court did not expressly engage in the kind of due process 
balancing that emerged in later civil due process cases.21 That test calls on 
courts to consider: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of that interest through existing procedures without additional 
protections; and (3) the government’s interest in avoiding the safeguards in 
question.22 Rather, in support of its mandate of juvenile-defense counsel, the 
Gault Court cited extensively to best practices recommended by experts who 
had been studying the issue, including federal executive branch agencies, 
such as the President’s Crime Commission and federal Children’s Bureau.23 
The Court also examined ways in which some states—although far less than 
a majority—had already begun the process of providing attorneys to accused 
youth.24 
Thus the Court applied a somewhat similar approach to the one used in 
the past in criminal cases under the broad banner of due process fairness. In 
the infamous Scottsboro Boys case, where it first used the term “guiding 
hand of counsel” to describe what had been denied the youthful defendants 
facing the death penalty, the Court found a right to court-appointment 
 
 17. Id. at 49–50.  
 18. See generally id. 
 19. Id. at 34–42. 
 20. Id. at 36.  
 21. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 22. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 38–41; THE CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., THE CHILDREN’S BUREAU LEGACY: ENSURING THE RIGHT TO CHILDHOOD 1952 
(2012) (describing the Children’s Bureau’s issuance of juvenile justice standards in 1967, 
which were relied on by the Supreme Court in Gault); see also Benjamin E. Friedman, Note, 
Protecting Truth: An Argument for Juvenile Rights and a Return to In Re Gault, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 165, 184 (2011) (discussing the impact of the President’s Crime Commission 
recommendations on the Gault decision). 
 24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 37–38 (noting that in 1967, one-third of states already allowed 
for retained counsel, notice of the right to counsel, or appointment of counsel). 
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representation implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.25 But Powell was seen 
by many as being contextually specific, with the Court noting the special 
vulnerability of the defendants there—all were young, Black, uneducated, 
contending with a hostile forum, and facing grave consequences.26 And 
Powell was also decided well before the 1963 case of Gideon v. Wainwright. 
In Gideon, the Court cast aside its prior holding in Betts v. Brady that Bill 
of Rights protections did not extend to the states.27 Instead, under Gideon, 
indigent accused persons in state court proceedings were granted the right 
to a free attorney under the Sixth Amendment.28 Its pronouncement was 
broad and bold, declaring that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”29 Borrowing language 
from the Scottsboro Boys decision, the Gideon Court spoke about the 
defendant’s need for the “guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him,” including to ascertain whether the indictment was 
properly filed, evaluate the evidence before trial, and engage in other 
pretrial strategizing.30 This expansive and absolute proclamation was 
embraced by civil libertarians as launching a sea change in state criminal 
courts. 
Yet at the time Gault was decided almost no one commented on its 
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment rather than embracing Gideon’s 
Sixth Amendment framework. In fact, this point had not even been argued 
by Gault’s counsel in his briefs to the Court.31 Gault’s attorney cited Gideon 
to support his claim that Gault should have been provided with 
representation under the Fourteenth Amendment.32 But he did not cite to 
or rely on the Sixth Amendment as a basis for the right to counsel or as a 
 
 25. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 26. See, e.g., Eugene Cerruti, Self-Representation in the International Arena: Removing a False 
Right of Spectacle, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 919, 936 (2009) (highlighting the Court’s apparently 
limiting statement that a right of counsel was needed in “a case such as this” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2034 
(2000) (describing the Scottsboro Boys case as “capital-specific”); see also Tom Watkins and 
Marlena Baldacci, Posthumous Pardons in 1931 Scottsboro Boys Rape Cases, CNN, (Nov. 21, 2013, 
8:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/21/justice/alabama-scottsboro-pardons/. 
 27. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963). 
 28. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 344–45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. See generally Brief for Appellants, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 116), 1966 WL 
100787. 
 32. Id. at 34–39. 
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means of interpreting it.33 Nevertheless, Gideon and Gault were both seen as 
part of larger civil rights movement undertaken by the Warren Court.34 
Indeed, some called the Gault decision “revolutionary.”35 Others 
claimed it required an entirely “new philosophy; a pragmatic realization that 
an infant is a citizen in his own right and entitled to the full benefit and 
protection of the Constitution.”36 But as practices and processes began to 
take shape on the ground, most came to see Gault as a pyrrhic victory. The 
deep reforms that many thought were presaged simply did not come to pass. 
III. DECADES OF GAULT DISILLUSIONMENT AND DREAMS OF GIDEON 
DELIVERANCE 
Criminologist Anthony Platt was one of the first commentators to 
identify Gault’s limited impact. Two years after it was handed down, Platt, 
along with collaborator Ruth Friedman, acknowledged that, in the decision’s 
wake, several states had passed laws that provided for appointment of 
counsel in juvenile courts.37 But they questioned whether Gault’s right to 
counsel had much meaning, particularly given the culture of the courts and 
continuing confusion about the role of the juvenile-defense attorney.38 
In 1969, Platt repeated and expanded these criticisms as part of his 
historic book, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency.39 He noted how 
“strong ideological and organizational pressure from legislatures, judges, 
and legal commentators” still worked to “repress adversary tactics in juvenile 
 
 33. See id. In fact, the Sixth Amendment is nowhere referenced in the brief’s Table of 
Authorities. Id. at vii. 
 34. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of 
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 897–98 (2013) (describing the implications of 
Gideon and Gault, together, as creating pressures around delivery of indigent defense 
representation); Linda S. Mullenix, God, Metaprocedure, and Metarealism at Yale, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
1139, 1145 (1989) (describing how legal academia changes in reaction to Gault and Gideon as 
part of the due process revolution) (reviewing ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988)); 
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr, Still Seeking the Promise of Gault: Juveniles and the Right to Counsel, 18 CRIM. 
JUST., Summer 2003, at 24–25 (framing Gault as part of the Warren Court’s extended due 
process revolution).  
 35. See Murray M. Milton, Post-Gault: A New Prospectus for the Juvenile Court, 16 N.Y. L.F. 57, 
59 (1970). 
 36. Milton, supra note 35, at 59; see also Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical 
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1970) (“The eventual result [of Gault] will very likely 
be drastic changes in the design and function of juvenile courts.”); Note, Parens Patriae and 
Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745, 750 n. 36 (1973) (noting enthusiastic 
support of Gault). 
 37. Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile 
Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1162–63 (1968). 
 38. Id. at 1176–84. 
 39. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 169 (1969) 
(in his chapter about the fate of the Progressive Era child-saving movement, Platt noted that 
“[a]lthough the public defender enjoys the contest of a trial, advocacy is nevertheless a limited 
commodity” in the juvenile courts he studied). 
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court.”40 And more than a decade after these first assessments, Platt warned 
that American juvenile courts had yet to evolve. Rather, they presented a 
“picture of increasing detention, widespread violations of due process, 
institutionalized racism and sexism, administrative chaos, and deteriorating 
social services.”41 
In the years that followed, others joined Platt’s critiques.42 Many 
derided the Court’s failure to more fully embrace criminal-court protections 
for juveniles, including the Sixth Amendment framework for court-
appointed counsel. One powerful wave of commentary at the end of the 
1980s and beginning of the 1990s included the voices of Janet Ainsworth, 
Katherine Federle, Barry Feld, and Martin Guggenheim.43 In light of Gault’s 
apparent failings, each called for abolition of the juvenile court system and 
referral of juvenile matters to the adult-criminal courts.44 These calls were so 
persuasive that the American Bar Association considered this possibility at 
 
 40. Id. at 165. 
 41. Tony Platt, Lowering Expectations, 88 YALE L.J. 1752, 1754 (1979) (reviewing ELLEN 
RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978)). Practitioners 
in the courts agreed with Platt’s observations; writing twenty years later, Irene Merker 
Rosenberg described her experience as a New York City juvenile defense attorney in the late 
1960s and early 1970s in this way: 
The judges were by and large uncaring and ignorant of both the rudiments of due 
process and the basic principles of child development and psychology; the 
probation department had an overwhelming caseload; and the state facilities in 
which the minors were detained and to which they were committed were walking 
Eighth Amendment violations.  
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Essay, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court 
Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 165. 
 42. See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Book Review, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1052, 1052 (1977) 
(reviewing PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976)) (“Of course, 
it is now beyond question that the juvenile justice system has worked badly.”); see also Morales v. 
Turman, 326 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (describing post-Gault conditions in Texas where 
youth were routinely denied counsel in juvenile court prosecutions and placed in substandard 
juvenile facilities away from home). 
 43. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: 
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991); Katherine Hunt Federle, 
The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children’s Legal Rights, 16 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of 
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989); see 
also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 723 (1991) 
(“Despite its transformation from a welfare agency to a criminal court, the juvenile court 
remains essentially unreformed.”); Rosenberg, supra note 41, 174 n.66 (describing this second-
wave post-Gault movement, including Martin Guggenheim’s initial support for dismantling 
juvenile courts and then change of heart, and her own disagreement with this camp).  
 44. Interestingly, there was also a critical counter movement that bemoaned Gault for 
giving youth too much protection and infusing Gault juvenile proceedings with too much 
formal process. In light of this, its adherents also called for the court to be dismantled. See 
Michael Kennedy Burke, This Old Court: Abolitionists Once Again Line Up the Wrecking Ball on the 
Juvenile Court When All It Needs Is a Few Minor Alterations, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1027 (1995).  
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an annual meeting in 1992.45 But in the end, obviously, juvenile-court 
jurisdiction was retained. 
Nevertheless, over the last few years, lamentations and proposals for 
reform have been revived.46 Advocates and academics have brought new 
energy and insights to the juvenile right-to-counsel conversation. Modern 
reformers offer these critiques both in light of the history of our juvenile 
courts and contemporary conditions encountered there.47 While not 
necessarily calling for an end to such institutions, this third wave of post-
Gault reformers has also pushed for infusing juvenile-court proceedings with 
greater right-to-counsel protections than presently exist. And nearly all root 
their positions in Sixth Amendment norms. 
For example, Barbara Fedders has criticized the Supreme Court for not 
going far enough in Gault when it provided young people with a right to 
counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment.48 Fedders argues that Gault’s 
failure to extend its holding beyond the trial process essentially granted 
watered down representational rights to juveniles as compared to adults.49 
“The scope of the right to counsel for adult criminal defendants,” she 
claims, “is broader” than the scope of juveniles’ rights.50 In particular, she 
laments the fact that the Gault Court did not expressly address the 
application of Sixth Amendment “critical stage” doctrine, which will be 
discussed further below.51 
Marsha Levick and Neha Desai have similarly catalogued the ways in 
which American youth still do not have “access to timely, zealous, and 
effective legal representation” in juvenile courts.52 Calling for the provision 
of counsel throughout the juvenile-court process—including those stages 
 
 45. Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 164. 
 46. Not all modern critics have expressly acknowledged that they are joining a recurring 
debate that has unfolded in waves over the decades. But this author believes it is helpful for 
modern reform movements to take stock of similar efforts that have come before. See Mae C. 
Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and Untold Stories of 
Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57 (2009). 
 47. See, e.g., Lauren Girard Adams et al., What Difference Can a Quality Lawyer Make for a 
Child, 38 LITIGATION 29, 31 (2011) (“In too many jurisdictions, children charged with 
delinquency offenses are pressured to waive counsel and plead guilty to charges without the 
benefit of a lawyer’s assistance.”); N. Lee Cooper et al. Fulfilling the Promise of In Re Gault: 
Advancing the Role of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 651–52 (1998) 
(describing how the 1990s ushered in a new era for juvenile courts with more public hearings, 
less confidentiality protections, greater numbers of youth transferred to adult court, and other 
“get tough” practices). 
 48. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in 
Juvenile Deliquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 782–85 (2010). 
 49. Id. at 783–84. 
 50. Id. at 784. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a 
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 175, 175 
(2007). 
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not mentioned by the Gault decision which related to trial alone—Levick 
and Desai argue that application of Sixth Amendment teachings would 
support such an expansive view of effective juvenile representation.53 Also 
focusing on “critical stage” doctrine developed in our adult-criminal courts, 
Levick and Desai examine various parts of juvenile-court proceedings to 
show how an adult in the same situation would be entitled to representation 
under the Sixth Amendment.54 
Finally, just last year, Robin Walker Sterling, a fellow participant in this 
Symposium, offered her own powerful denunciation of Gault.55 Walker 
Sterling sees the Court’s failure to provide youth with a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel—rather than their current right to representation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s fundamental fairness framework—as a lost 
opportunity.56 Taking this road, she argues, “exacerbated disparate 
treatment of children of color in the juvenile justice system.”57 Indeed, she 
asserts that the racial disparity that occurs at various junctures throughout 
the juvenile process—including citation versus arrest determinations, intake 
and prosecutorial screening, and dispositional decisions—“can be laid at the 
feet of the Gault decision.”58 
It is hard to disagree with the concerns expressed by modern reformers 
about the ever-expanding reach of our juvenile courts—institutions which 
ensnare countless youth of color in this country each year, stigmatize them, 
demoralize them, impose restrictions on their lives and liberty, and 
ultimately work to reduce their life chances.59 But borrowing from 
observations offered twenty years ago by Irene Rosenberg during the second 
wave of post-Gault lamentations—it appears “underlying the views” of many 
of today’s juvenile-court reformers “at least unconsciously, is a somewhat 
idealized or romanticized vision of adult courts in which the criminal 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights are meaningfully enforced.”60 
 
 53. Id. at 183–90. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 
MD. L. REV. 607, 608 (2013). 
 56. Id. at 614–15 (“Gault’s reliance on a fundamental fairness analysis based in Fourteenth 
Amendment due process analysis, instead of on a fundamental rights analysis based in the Bill 
of Rights, was a critical misstep.”). 
 57. Id. at 660. 
 58. Id. at 662–76. 
 59. See generally, e.g, Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 1447 (2009); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities 
of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383 (2013); Perry L. 
Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 285 (2008); Mae C. Quinn, The Fallout from Our Blackboard Battlegrounds: A Call 
for Withdrawal and a New Way Forward, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541 (2012). 
 60. Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 173 (footnote omitted). 
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In fact, Supreme Court Sixth Amendment doctrine developed post-
Gideon provides a rather anemic right to counsel as compared to Gideon’s 
rhetoric—one that is even less satisfying as practiced and applied in modern 
trial-level courts. Thus merely applying Sixth Amendment doctrine to 
juvenile cases may do more harm than good by artificially cabining the kind 
of nimble and creative youth advocacy that needs to be delivered in juvenile-
court proceedings. And it is possible there is greater space in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to allow for the development of a right to, and role of, juvenile-
defense counsel that is both age-appropriate and holistic in its contours. 
IV. BEING CAREFUL ABOUT WHAT WE WISH FOR: GIDEON’S LACKLUSTER 
LEGACY 
A. LIMITED AND LIMITING LEGAL DOCTRINES 
Sixth Amendment rules that have developed post-Gideon hardly provide 
a robust rights-protecting framework. The right to appointed counsel 
applies only when a formal case is pending against a defendant and, even 
then, in limited, purportedly “critical,” moments during the prosecution. 
Accordingly, the constitutional role of counsel has been conceptualized in a 
restricted way that requires meaningful representation at a few flash points 
in the process and not in a continual and comprehensive manner. These 
standards have been repeatedly criticized as being too narrow and 
formalistic—even for framing the right to, and role of, counsel in adult-
criminal courts. 
Nearly a decade after Gideon was decided, the Court clarified in Kirby v. 
Illinois that an individual does not have a right to appointed counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment until the adversary process has started.61 Over time 
the Court has provided further guidance about what this means in the 
criminal-court context. For instance, a decade after Kirby, in United States v. 
Gouveia, the Court explained that the “formal criminal proceeding[]” marks 
the moment when the right to counsel attaches for adult defendants.62 The 
following year it expanded on this view in Moran v. Burbine, noting that only 
after the government moves its focus from the investigation to accusation 
phase does a defendant require the assistance of a lawyer.63 More recently, 
in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, the Court made clear that appointment of 
counsel is required for arraignment and bail hearings, even if a prosecutor is 
not present.64 But the focus was still on the government’s decision to 
formally prosecute and the institution of the adversarial process.65 
 
 61. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–91 (1972) (plurality decision). 
 62. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984). 
 63. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431–32 (1986). 
 64. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). 
 65. Id. 
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Beyond the moment when the formal prosecution process begins, and 
during trial, adult-criminal defendants are entitled to representation only 
during other parts of the criminal process that are considered similarly 
“critical.”66 The Court has held that such stages include post-indictment 
interrogations,67 post-indictment lineups,68 preliminary hearings,69 and 
sentencing proceedings.70 To determine whether any other stage or phase of 
the criminal process is critical, trial courts have been directed to ask 
“whether potential substantial prejudice to [the] defendant’s rights inheres 
in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that 
prejudice.”71 Courts have used this test to find that the right to counsel does 
not attach at numerous other parts of the criminal process, including certain 
kinds of motion litigation,72 pre-sentence probation interviews,73 and 
supervised release proceedings.74 
The Sixth Amendment’s right to representation is also limited to those 
cases in which the right has formally attached. This is because the Court has 
held that Sixth Amendment protections are charge- and offense-specific.75 
The state has been permitted, therefore, to gather information from a 
defendant about other matters that are not the subject of the pending case 
in which representation has been provided.76 Thus, as many commentators 
have noted, taken together, these rules have largely worked to restrict the 
expansive right to, and role of, counsel suggested by the Sixth Amendment’s 
own text and Gideon’s rhetoric.77 
 
 66. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–96 (2002) (“A trial would be presumptively 
unfair, we said, where the accused is denied the presence of counsel at ‘a critical stage’ . . . .” 
(citing United States v. Cronic, 566 U.S. 648, 659 (1984))). 
 67. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 68. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). 
 69. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970). 
 70. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–62 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 
(1967).  
 71. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
 72. See, e.g., Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no right to counsel at a 
hearing where the court consolidated defendant’s case with those of other defendants charged 
with involvement in the same crime); Runnels v. State, 896 P.2d 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) 
(finding no right to counsel where motion for new trial not essential to preserving issues for 
appellate review). 
 73. See, e.g., Stuart v. State, 180 P.3d 506 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (finding no right to 
counsel at a “routine presentence interview” because collecting largely publically available data 
differs from a psycho-sexual evaluation). 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no right to 
counsel at federal supervised release hearing). 
 75. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).  
 76. See id. at 180–81. 
 77. See, e.g., Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2009); Michael J. Howe, Note, Tomorrow’s Massiah: Towards a 
“Prosecution Specific” Understanding of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
134 (2004). 
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For instance, Pamela Metzger, law professor and former public 
defender, has argued that the right to counsel contemplated by the bright-
line “critical stage” analysis is largely out of step with norms of modern 
criminal-court proceedings.78 Such a mechanistic test focusing on 
confrontational and adversarial features of the process overlooks too many 
parts of contemporary criminal prosecutions—which are far less trial 
focused than in days past—where a defendant can be prejudiced without the 
assistance of a trained lawyer.79 
Others have offered similar critiques of the “charge focused” and 
“offense specific” doctrines that have emerged post-Gideon. Even former 
federal prosecutors have warned these rules are frequently applied in a rigid 
manner that fails to account for modern criminal law practices.80 They 
overlook delays in formal charging decisions and other more subtle 
practices that work to keep government conduct off of the Sixth 
Amendment radar.81 Allowing the prosecution to hide behind these 
doctrines, they argue, can work to prevent “fair and unfettered access” to a 
lawyer.82 
It is true that in the last few years the Supreme Court has revisited the 
concept of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, in 
part acknowledging some of the critiques above. For instance, in 2010, it 
decided Padilla v. Kentucky, which expanded an attorney’s professional duty 
to advise a client of the collateral civil immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea.83 Failure to do so now may support an ineffectiveness claim.84 And this 
past year in Missouri v. Frye85 and Lafler v. Cooper,86 the Court affirmatively 
enhanced defense-attorney effective assistance duties in the context of 
counseling around guilty pleas, even where immigration consequences were 
not present. This series of cases has caused some to suggest we have entered 
a new defendant-favoring era under the Sixth Amendment, one that is less 
 
 78. See, e.g., Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel 
Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2003) (“The rhetoric of the Sixth Amendment is grand; 
the reality is grim.”). 
 79. See id. at 1689; see also In re Carter, 848 A.2d 281, 298–99 (Vt. 2004) (citing to 
Metzger’s work in finding that an interview by probation staff constitutes a time when the Sixth 
Amendment right to appointed counsel applies, even if it is a “non-adversarial” event).  
 80. James S. Montana, Jr. & John A. Galotto, Right to Counsel: Courts Adhere to Bright-Line Limits, 
16 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. MAG. 4 (2001), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
criminal_justice_magazine_home/crimjust_cjmag_16_2_montanta.html (“Two related principles—
that the right only attaches at the commencement of formal judicial proceedings and that the right is 
“offense specific”—remained intact because the Supreme Court adopted and endorsed a formalistic 
approach to the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 81. Id. at 9–10. 
 82. Id. at 5. 
 83. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010). 
 84. Id. at 1486. 
 85. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 86. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
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trial-centered and better rooted in the realities of current criminal-court 
practices.87 
But these cases must also be considered in light of other contemporary 
decisions that work to restrict the right and role of defense counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment. For instance, in a different but related series of 
decisions, the Supreme Court recently diluted the defendant’s right to 
counsel by suggesting Miranda warnings are enough to protect the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel even after counsel has been 
appointed.88 So while the government was previously precluded from using 
information gathered from a represented defendant about the subject of his 
pending case,89 it may be able to do so now so long as the defendant has 
been reminded of his rights under Miranda and appears to waive those 
rights.90 
Therefore, the actual doctrinal implications and impact of these new 
decisions, taken together, has yet to be seen.91 And as was powerfully 
recounted by others at this symposium, as it stands now, day-to-day Sixth 
Amendment realities in our adult-criminal courts remain grim. 
B. PROMISE IN PRACTICE: FIFTY YEARS OF FAULTY REPRESENTATION 
Gideon, just as much as Gault, has traveled a troubled path, 
disappointing critics, criminal defendants, and communities along the way. 
The modern adult criminal-court system contributes to the degradation and 
lived injustice experienced by many indigent accused persons—particularly 
young men of color—even with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in place. 
Thus, the criminal-justice system in this country is nothing to celebrate—or 
replicate—as we consider how to best protect and represent accused 
minority youth.92 
 
 87. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1162–63 (2012) (asserting that Lafler and Frye “reject[ed] a cramped, 
formulistic view of the right to counsel” and will “have immediate and far-reaching 
implications”).  
 88. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090–91 (2009); see also Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010). 
 89. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
397–98 (1977). 
 90. Montego, 129 S. Ct. at 2091; see also Geoffrey M. Sweeney, Casenote, If You Want It, You 
Had Better Ask for It: How Montejo v. Louisiana Permits Law Enforecement to Sidestep the Sixth 
Amendment, 55 LOY. L. REV. 619 (2009). 
 91. See Jed Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 27 
(2012) (“[T]he long-term influence of these cases in subtly discouraging defense counsel from 
taking aggressive positions on behalf of their clients, or just from taking the time necessary to 
develop a full defense, may be to harm the defendants themselves.”). 
 92. “In determining whether to abandon the juvenile courts because of the disparity in 
protection, it is also necessary to make a realistic assessment of the constitutional safeguards 
available in the criminal courts.” Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 171. 
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In Gideon, the Supreme Court made clear that individual states needed 
to financially support indigent defense services.93 Pointing out that “vast 
sums of money” were being spent “to establish machinery to try defendants 
accused of crime,” including to hire prosecutors, the Court warned that 
defense lawyers need to be seen as similar “necessities, not luxuries.”94 Even 
as it expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to misdemeanor cases 
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court rejected the idea that claims of limited 
resources could be used to hinder delivery of defense services.95 But fifty 
years later, states are still sidestepping Gideon’s mandate. Many defender 
programs are all but crumbling under the weight of ever increasing 
caseloads while watching their budgets diminish. 
The New York Times reported on requests by the Missouri’s public-
defender system to turn away cases. The state’s high court ruled in favor of 
the defender system, acknowledging offices did not have enough lawyers or 
money to handle all of the cases being assigned.96 The Missouri Supreme 
Court suggested public defenders and judges should work together to ration 
representation resources.97 But, of course, as noted forty years ago in 
Argersinger, purportedly minor matters—including juvenile prosecutions—
can have major consequences.98 In addition, when they began turning away 
cases consistent with the Court’s order, Missouri public defenders suffered 
tremendous backlash.99 The Governor withheld $1.4 million from the 
system—money that was already promised under a budget signed into law.100 
Other defender systems are contending with similarly impossible 
burdens and political battles.101 In the South, the Knox County Community 
Law Office in Tennessee, led by nationally respected director Mark 
 
 93. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972).  
 96. Monica Davey, Budget Woes Hit Defense Lawyers for the Indigent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/us/10defenders.html?pagewanted=all. 
 97. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 887 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc). 
 98. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. 
 99. Editorial Board, Editorial: Piling On the Missouri Public Defender System, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Nov. 1, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-
platform/editorial-piling-on-the-missouri-public-defender-system/article_1abd346f-4301-566a-
9ecf-aecca130bf61.html. 
 100. Mike Lear, Public Defenders Warn of Hiring Freeze, Furloughs, MISSOURINET (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.missourinet.com/2013/10/24/public-defenders-warn-of-hiring-freeze-furloughs/. 
Public defender administrators confirmed a hiring freeze as of November 1, 2013, declaring, “It’s a 
very serious situation. It’s not good for our employees, it’s not good for our clients and it won’t be 
good for victims and local county jails that will have folks waiting in jail longer.” Id. 
 101. In some states, the battle has involved simply creating a public defender system in the 
first instance, as in Michigan. See Tanya Greene, Victory! Michigan Turns the Corner on Public 
Defense Reform, ACLU (July 1, 2013, 4:55 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-
reform/victory-michigan-turns-corner-public-defense-reform. 
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Stephens, brought a lawsuit in the hopes of addressing its expanding 
caseloads.102 Rather than getting the relief sought, government officials are 
now focused on Knoxville defenders as being overpaid, because they spend 
$369 per case—more than the state average of $291.103 Georgia,104 
Louisiana,105 and Florida106 are facing similar challenges as they represent 
more indigent defendants each year than professional standards allow. 
Northern states are struggling too. Pennsylvania’s Luzerne County 
Public Defender’s Office sued government officials to try to access sufficient 
funds to handle its crushing caseload,107 as have offices in New York.108 Even 
the Federal Public Defender System has been forced to operate under 
impossible conditions. American Bar Association President James R. Silkenat 
has publically berated Congress for what it has done to federal defender 
funding, calling its actions an “embarrassment” in the face of our country’s 
commitment to the “rule of law.”109 And New York’s Chief Federal Defender, 
David Patton, has conceded that his staff is “outgunned” by the prosecution, 
where he has thirty-eight lawyers to defend against three-hundred Assistant 
United States Attorneys in his region.110 
In some places, as part of the effort to reduce defender caseloads, piece-
meal solutions of no-jail misdemeanor dockets and “problem-solving” courts 
are being offered as alternatives to adversarial criminal-court proceedings. 
In many such venues, defense attorneys are dispensed with as unnecessary. 
But, unfortunately, these “innovations” often result in the same kind of 
sanctions and liberty deprivations as traditional courts—albeit on a slower 
schedule—all without the benefit of legal counsel or counseling. 
 
 102. Jamie Satterfield, Cost for Concern: Knox County Spends Most in State on Indigent Legal Services, 
KNOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 21, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/aug/21/cost-
for-concern/. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Emily Green, State Slapped with Lawsuit over Indigent Defense, S. CENTER FOR HUM. RTS. (Dec. 
15, 2009), http://www.schr.org/action/resources/state_slapped_with_lawsuit_over_indigent_ 
defense. 
 105. John Simerman, Public Defender Sues New Orleans Traffic Court over Unpaid Fees, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (July 31, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/07/public_ 
defender_sues_new_orlea.html. 
 106. Jim Saunders, Miami-Dade Public Defender Allowed to Pull out of Cases Because of Workload, 
MIAMI HERALD (May 23, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/23/3412933/miami-
dade-public-defender-allowed.html. 
 107. John Rudolf, Pennsylvania Public Defenders Rebel Against Crushing Caseloads, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 16, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/pennsylvania-
public-defenders_n_1556192.html. 
 108. Alysia Santo, Still No Resolution in Public Defender Suit, TIMES UNION (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:50 
AM), www.timesunion.com/local/article/Still-no-resolution-in-public-defender-suit-4840560.php. 
 109. ABA President Rails against Budget Cuts to Federal Public Defender Program, A.B.A (Aug. 23, 
2013, 12:27 PM), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/08/ 
aba_president_rails.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Id. 
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For instance, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
recently undertook The Misdemeanor Project to evaluate practices within 
low-level criminal courts across the country.111 The Project focused on 
venues where Argersinger is still being interpreted—despite the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Alabama v. Shelton112—to apply only when the defendant 
is sentenced to imprisonment. They found that while many defendants were 
not sent to jail on the spot, they left court with the threat of incarceration 
hanging over their head with suspended and other complex sentence 
agreements.113 Yet they entered guilty pleas and received such deferred 
sentences without the assistance of appointed counsel.114 And, of course, 
many of these defendants were left with significant collateral consequences 
from their convictions—consequences no lawyer ever told them about.115 
Even in cases where fines are imposed on unrepresented poor persons, 
it is often just a matter of time before they are incarcerated for lack of 
payment in a manner that is reminiscent of debtors prisons of days past.116 
Similarly, in the thousands of “problem-solving” courts that have cropped up 
across the country incarceration is all too frequently delayed—not 
avoided.117 These courts are popular because of their purportedly non-
adversarial approaches.118 Yet, participants may be jailed and otherwise 
deprived of their liberty at “review” hearings without an attorney to advocate 
for them.119 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that in many states 
 
 111. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE 
WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/misdemeanor_20090401.pdf; see also 
Maureen Dimino, Misdemeanor Courts are in Need of Repair, 33 CHAMPION 36, June. 2009 (recounting 
her work as a NACDL court observer for the Misdemeanor Project). 
 112. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (holding that an indigent defendant 
should be provided with counsel even if a jail sentence will be suspended or probated). 
 113. BORUCHOWITZ, BRINK & DIMINO, supra note 112. 
 114. Id.; see also Dimino, supra note 111. 
 115. Dimino, supra note 111; see also Keith Rushing, Virginia’s System of Waiving Jail Time and 
Legal Counsel for Minor Offenses Boosts Deportations, RTS. WORKING GROUP (Jan. 31, 2013, 11:08 
AM), http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/content/virginia%E2%80%99s-system-waiving-jail-
time-and-legal-counsel-minor-offenses-boosts-deportations. 
 116. See Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for Probation, N.Y. TIMES (July 
2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-fees-multiply-as-companiesprofit. 
html; Alain Sherter, As Economy Flails, Debtors’ Prisons Thrive, CBSNEWS.COM (April 5, 2013, 12:39 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-economy-flails-debtors-prisons-thrive; Op-Ed., Return of Debtors’ 
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/ 14/opinion/return-of-
debtors-prisons.html(“[J]udges routinely jail people to make them pay fines even when they have no 
money to pay.”).  
 117. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 46, at 66–67. 
 118. Id. at 59–62. 
 119. Id. at 65–67; see also Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public 
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 37, 64 (2000). 
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where public defenders are least supported, like Missouri, “problem-solving” 
courts are supported most. 120 
Not only does the current system ensure that some of the country’s 
most vulnerable citizens remain forever under the weight of poverty,121 but 
most of those poor are young Black males.122 As has been well documented 
by Michelle Alexander,123 Paul Butler,124 Bryan Stevenson,125 and others in 
recent years, contemporary criminal courts maintain a de facto caste system 
that has historically disenfranchised and dehumanized persons of color.126 
We need to look no further than the sidewalks that surround our 
criminal courts as they open for business each day to bear witness to the 
shaming and stigma that we heap onto thousands of young African-
American men—many for the most trivial of alleged wrongdoings.127 These 
 
 120. See Marshall Griffin, Mary Russell to Become Chief Justice of Mo. Supreme Court Next Week, 
ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (June 26, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/mary-
russell-become-chief-justice-mo-supreme-court-next-week (noting the expansion of specialty 
courts as one of the top priorities for Missouri’s court system); Drug Court Facts, MO. ASS’N OF 
DRUG CT. PROF., http://www.modrugcourts.org/showpage.php?page=5 (last visited May 20, 
2014) (claiming Missouri drug courts “are a proven cost-effective method for diverting non-
violent offenders from incarceration in prisons”); Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, 
WEBPAGE - PUBLIC INFORMATION, http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=250 (describing seven 
different kinds of problem-solving courts where “[t]he treatment team may”—or may not—
include a defense attorney). 
 121. See Tracy Velázquez, “Criminalizing” Poverty, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY & OPPORTUNITY 
(Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org/ExclusiveCommentary.aspx?id=5f13e0fe-
a47d-4ce4-a945-187fc331e81d (noting that after poor people are released from incarceration, 
“they are relegated to poverty once again because of the punitive barriers society has set up to 
prevent their success”). 
 122. See John Tierney, Prison and the Poverty Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/science/long-prison-terms-eyed-as-contributing-to-poverty. 
html (quoting a Harvard sociologist as declaring prison “has become a routine event for poor 
African-American men and their families, creating an enduring disadvantage at the very bottom of 
American society” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 123. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
 124. See generally PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009). 
 125. See Eva Rodriguez, Bryan Stevenson, the Man Behind the Juvenile Justice Cases Decided by the 
Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 25, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-25/ 
lifestyle/35459355_1_juvenile-justice-cases-violent-crime-juvenile-offenders (detailing Stevenson’s 
work toward abolishing mandatory life imprisonment for juveniles, most of whom were “poor and 
kids of color”). 
 126. Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of 
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 887–88 (2013) (describing the “race-and-crime” 
and “race in criminal justice” narratives arising during the Warren Court period); James 
Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 
58–61 (2012) (comparing the impact of mass incarceration on various racial populations).  
 127. Robin Steinberg, Addressing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System Through Holistic 
Defense, THE CHAMPION, July 2013, available at http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=29517 
(“Racial disparity in the criminal justice system is a problem with which public defenders are 
intimately familiar. They see it every day in courthouses across the country where people of 
A14_QUINN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  9:04 PM 
2014] GIVING KIDS THEIR DUE 2205 
images leave all viewers with a definite understanding of who is and who is 
not deserving of life and liberty in this country. They deliver messages far 
louder than the promises of Gideon that seem like whispers from decades 
ago. And for these individuals—while on public display and while they carry 
the long-term consequences of their court involvement—the Sixth 
Amendment provides little solace.128 
V. FURTHER MAKING THE CASE FOR SEEING THINGS DIFFERENTLY: COURTS 
AND KIDS 
It is against this backdrop that this Essay questions the call to adopt the 
same Sixth Amendment protections and practices in our nation’s juvenile 
courts. It is true that Gault has yet to fully deliver; many youth still negotiate 
our juvenile-justice system without counsel, let alone quality representation. 
More than this, today’s juvenile-court prosecutions—no different from those 
in our criminal courts—disproportionately impact minority youth, working 
to entangle them in the justice system while reducing their life chances. But 
adding further doctrinal restrictions and Sixth Amendment formalism 
around juvenile representation would not improve the situation nor result 
in greater support and empowerment of such youth. Turning to another 
broken system for solutions seems like no new way forward at all. 
Instead, this Essay offers a different possible approach that focuses on 
the important differences between contemporary juvenile and criminal 
courts—and contemporary understandings of juveniles and adult 
defendants. Thus, rather than fight for kids to be treated like adults under 
Gideon, it may be time to try to breathe greater life into Gault to better 
inform the right to, and role of, defense counsel for youth. In doing so we 
might be able to finally establish a meaningful constitutional due process 
theory of juvenile representation—one that not only accounts for the 
entirety of the juvenile justice process with all of its “peculiar” features but 
also holds the system accountable.129 
A. DISPOSITIONAL AND OTHER DIFFERENCES IN THE COURTS 
In Gault the Court described two cornerstone components of American 
juvenile courts—rehabilitation interventions and protective informal 
procedures.130 The Court did not strike down these features, but warned 
 
color from low income communities line the crowded hallways, fill the courtroom benches, and 
sit at the defense table in staggering and disproportionate numbers.”). 
 128. See generally Regina Austin, “The Shame of It All”: Stigma and the Political 
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173 
(2004); Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 
(1997); SpearIt, Legal Punishment as Civil Ritual: Making Cultural Sense of Harsh Punishment, 82 
MISS. L.J. 1 (2013). 
 129. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). 
 130. See id. at 16–19. 
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that they can serve as double-edge swords if not managed appropriately.131 
Its decision to guarantee counsel in juvenile matters was intended not only 
to help youth defend against accusations, but to assist them to negotiate 
juvenile court’s amorphous proceedings and ensure their regularity.132 So 
while the Court limited its express findings to the adjudication hearing—
leaving to another day the “pre-judicial stages” and “post-adjudicative . . . 
process”133—it was quite clear that meaningful defense representation was 
intended to serve as a check on the good intentions and broad discretion 
present in juvenile-court practices.134 
If the juvenile process was “peculiar” and difficult for a child to fully 
comprehend in the 1960s, it has become labyrinthine today.135 Many agree 
that juvenile-court proceedings are far more complex and complicated than 
adult-criminal-court matters.136 The process may include intake proceedings 
where juveniles are interviewed by state actors, pre-prosecution efforts to 
refer children to treatment programs, detention hearings, complex guilty 
plea offers, dispositions that can result in long-term direct and indirect 
consequences, and certification proceedings that result in a child facing 
adult prosecution and a sentence of life behind bars.137 Thus, juvenile-court 
features and practices are incredibly idiosyncratic and require deeply 
specialized knowledge to understand and meaningfully negotiate.138 
Beyond this, the life cycle of a juvenile case is generally quite different 
from that of a criminal case. Given their often discretionary and 
indeterminate nature, the end of a case may be impossible to predict.139 
Youth may be required to return to juvenile court for multiple review 
 
 131. Id. at 15–21. 
 132. Id. at 36 (“The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to . . . insist upon regularity of 
the proceedings . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 133. Id. at 13; cf. Fedders, supra note 48, at 783 (lamenting the Gault Court’s failure to 
address the right to juvenile-defense counsel beyond the trial context, but acknowledging that 
pre- and post-trial representation was “not at issue in the factual context of Gault”). 
 134. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.  
 135. See Mark Ells et al., Unraveling the Labyrinth: A Proposed Revision of the Nebraska Juvenile 
Code, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1126, 1130 (2004) (recounting how the Nebraska Supreme Court 
referred to one piece of juvenile court litigation as “labyrinthine”) (quoting Wheeler v. D.D. (In 
re Interest of L.D.), 398 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Neb. 1986)).  
 136. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About 
the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111 (2006). 
 137. See Sue Burrell, Contracts for Appointed Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Cases: Defining 
Expectations, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 314, 360–61 tbl. 3 (2012); see also Levick & Desai, 
supra note 52, at 184–91 (examining juvenile procedure in light of the Sixth Amendment). 
 138. See generally Burrell, supra note 137. 
 139. See Jeffrey K. Day, Comment, Juvenile Justice in Washington: A Punitive System in Need of 
Rehabilitation, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 399, 434–35 (1992) (describing how the 
indeterminancy in juvenile court dispositions leaves the court with great discretion to decide 
what kind of intervention to order and when to end the case); see also Levick & Desai, supra note 
52, at 181 (“[J]uvenile court dispositions . . . are indeterminate . . . .”). 
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hearings to see how they are doing on a rehabilitative path.140 This is 
because, unlike adult-criminal courts, juvenile courts take jurisdiction over 
the youth before them: it is not so much a particular charge but the child 
herself who falls under the court’s review. Thus a disposition may be 
modified or expanded to include any number of additional claims and 
concerns that arise during the course of the court having jurisdiction.141 In 
such proceedings, the “phase” or “stage” of the process may become murky 
and difficult to define. 
More than this, the extent to which social work, mental health, and 
substance abuse interventions are part of the fabric of the court and its 
workings also makes juvenile court different from criminal courts.142 It is 
true that in the last twenty years more adult-criminal courts have attempted 
to become “problem-solving” through their use of treatment interventions 
instead of incarceration. But such practices remain discrete outliers in a 
system that centers on incarceration.143 In fact, such “innovative” efforts have 
been compared to long-standing norms and practices in juvenile court.144 
Contemporary Sixth Amendment rules do not account for these 
unusual and complex features of juvenile court. Nor are they—with their 
formalism and inflexibility—well-suited as standards for establishing the role 
of counsel in such proceedings. Therefore, assuming we do not dismantle 
the juvenile-court system in its entirety, which most of today’s reformers do 
not advocate, it is clear that simply importing Sixth Amendment 
representational rules into today’s juvenile proceedings will not adequately 
serve or protect youth. 
B. DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER DISTINCTIONS IN DEFENDANTS 
Not only are juvenile court proceedings different from those in our 
criminal courts, but those who stand accused are obviously quite different 
too. Referring to fifteen-year-old Gerald as a mere “boy” as it contrasted him 
to “adults” prosecuted in our criminal courts,145 the Gault court was very 
much concerned with how juveniles’ lack of sophistication impacts them in 
 
 140. Levick & Desai, supra note 52, at 181 (“Some jurisdictions provide for formal judicial 
review of a youth’s progress in placement or on probation . . . .”). 
 141. See Jim Moye, Don’t Tread on Me to Help Me: Does the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 
2001 Violate Due Process by Extolling the “One Family, One Judge” Theory?, 57 SMU L. REV. 1521, 
1526 (2004). 
 142. Burrell, supra note 137, at 347–49 (discussing the need for appointed counsel to learn 
about the specific features of juvenile cases and issues specific to adolescents).  
 143. See Quinn, supra note 46. 
 144. See Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951, 
955–82 (2006) (discussing the history of juvenile courts and the creation of specialty juvenile 
courts); Nadav Zamir, Problem-Solving Litigation for the Elderly: An Eventual Shift with a Cautionary 
Approach, 25 J. C. R. & ECON. DEV. 1023, 1040–41 & n.104 (2011). 
 145. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1967). 
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our courts.146 Since then, the Court’s intuition about the differences 
between young people and adult defendants has been scientifically proven 
and more concretely explored by youth advocates and academics.147 
Over the last decade, findings in neuroscience, biology, and psychology 
have informed modern understandings of the capacity of young people.148 
We now know youth are less likely to comprehend legal jargon than 
adults.149 They are also developmentally less able to resist pressures of 
others, comprehend consequences, and make future-oriented decisions.150 
These findings have been extensively cited by the Supreme Court in its most 
recent decisions relating to juveniles, holding that youth are categorically 
less culpable than adults.151 The Court has now jurisprudentially embraced 
these differences in establishing different youth-centered rights and rules 
under both the Eighth and Fifth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.152 
VI. GOING BACK TO GAULT: TOWARDS A MODERN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
In light of the differences between criminal and juvenile courts—in 
both the people being represented and the proceedings in which they find 
themselves—it seems clear the doctrines and standards that have evolved 
under the Sixth Amendment are not sufficiently robust or nuanced to 
account for the needs of young people in our juvenile-justice system. Thus, 
as this Part will suggest, perhaps it is time to return to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to further mine its depths for a more meaningful framework 
for the right to, and role of, counsel in juvenile-court proceedings. 
 
 146. Id. at 48 (noting that confessions obtained from children and adolescents need to be 
received with distrust). 
 147. See, e.g., Jahaan Shaheed, The “Amorphous Reasonable Attorney” Standard: A Checklist 
Approach to Ineffective Counsel in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 911 (2011) (“To 
have the capacity to assist counsel, juveniles must receive information from their attorneys, 
properly comprehend this information, and understand the implications of the information 
that their attorneys provide.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 
1009 (2003). 
 149. See Ells et al., supra note 135, at 1130 (noting that youth have difficulty understanding 
Miranda warnings). 
 150. See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability, & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 
CRIM. JUST. 26, 27–29 (2000); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A 
Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 
356–58 (2003); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and 
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 810 (2005). 
 151. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. 
Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
 152. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031; Roper, 
543 U.S. at 574. 
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A. PAST CALLS FOR A COHERENT FAIRNESS FRAMEWORK FOR JUVENILE-DEFENSE 
COUNSEL 
Over the years a few scholars and youth advocates have, in fact, called 
for further embrace of the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel for 
youth. Their work started us down the road towards challenging the 
assumption that the right to counsel provided to children under the 
Fourteenth Amendment—while different—must necessarily be less 
protective or expansive than the right to counsel provided under the Sixth 
Amendment.153 
For instance, in 2003, Emily Buss critiqued commentators who applied 
Gault’s teachings to create a “false dichotomy” of “adult rights or no 
rights.”154 As a result of this approach, she argued, youth have been provided 
with a “patchwork” of protections seeking to “split the difference” between 
these two views.155 Her work begins to suggest something other than a 
simplistic, binary view around the right to, and role of, counsel for youth.156 
Thus, she called for “a coherent set of due process rights for children.”157 
Ellen Marrus offered a similar challenge in a series of articles that 
embraced Gault’s due process framework for juvenile representation.158 She, 
too, suggested the Due Process Clause might be a better tool for taking 
account of the special attributes of juvenile-court proceedings and the 
children impacted by them.159 As argued here, Marrus explained that 
juveniles need even more assistance than adult defendants as they make 
their way through the prosecutorial process.160 Thus, competent 
representation should be defined differently for them. 
But interestingly, both Buss and Marrus were writing before the 
Supreme Court’s previously discussed doctrinal pronouncements, starting in 
2005, which modified constitutional standards to take account of adolescent 
development theory in cases involving youth. Since that time, others have 
 
 153. Cf. Fedders, supra note 48, at 775, 817–18 (claiming that “the right to counsel for 
children in delinquency proceedings is more limited in scope than the comparable adult right,” 
yet also suggesting further embrace of the Fourteenth Amendment to resolve juvenile court 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
 154. Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 43 (2003) 
 155. Id.  
 156. See id. at 43–44; see also Birckhead, supra note 59, at 1468 (“When the expansion of 
juveniles’ rights is based solely on the Sixth Amendment, the most likely model will be an adult 
criminal court, thereby failing to shift the juvenile justice paradigm.”). 
 157. Buss, supra note 154, at 43.  
 158. Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic 
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 298–300 (2003) [hereinafter 
Marrus, Best Interests]; Ellen Marrus, Effective Assistance of Counsel in the Wonderland of “Kiddie 
Court”—Why the Queen of Hearts Trumps Strickland, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 393 (2003) [hereinafter 
Marrus, Wonderland]. 
 159. See Marrus, Best Interests, supra note 157; Marrus, Wonderland, supra note 157. 
 160. See generally Marrus, Best Interests, supra note 158. 
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called for the application of these scientific findings to different features of 
the juvenile-justice system—including the right to and role of counsel.161 But 
these calls, which seem to apply some hybrid of Sixth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrines, primarily focus on the specific questions 
of whether youth should be permitted to waive counsel,162 and how to 
evaluate post hoc claims of ineffective assistance.163 Thus, to date, a 
comprehensive due process framework for active juvenile-defense 
representation has not been formulated. 
B. BACK TO BASICS: GAULT’S EMBRACE OF EMERGING VIEWS AND VOICES 
In beginning to build a Fourteenth Amendment framework for the 
right to, and role of, juvenile-defense counsel, it is important to remember 
what Gault actually did—and did not—do. Contrary to the suggestions of 
some commentators,164 it did not decide against a robust right to counsel for 
youth. It expressly left to another day the question of how early in the 
process counsel must enter and how long they must remain.165 The Court 
also said the juvenile-court trial proceeding itself might be less formal than a 
more public criminal-court trial, thereby arguably limiting the application of 
other Bill of Rights protections to juvenile proceedings.166 But it did not 
hold that the representation provided to young people should also be 
limited in its nature or quality.167 
In fact, as noted earlier, the Court did not expressly apply the stringent 
Fourteenth Amendment balancing tests that it applied in other decisions 
that have sought to determine the role and scope of appointed counsel in 
 
 161. See generally, e.g., Jennifer K. Pokempner et al., The Legal Significance of Adolescent 
Development on the Right to Counsel: Establishing the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Teens in Child 
Welfare Matters and Assuring a Meaningful Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters, 47 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 529 (2012); see also Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal 
Signficance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In Re Gault, 60 
RUTGERS L. REV. 125 (2007). 
 162. See generally Pokempner, supra note 161; Bishop & Farber, supra note 161; Friedman, 
supra note 22. 
 163. See generally Fedders, supra note 48; Shaheed, supra note 148. 
 164. See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 48, at 783. 
 165. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (“We do not even consider the entire process relating to 
juvenile ‘delinquents.’ . . . We consider only the problems presented to us by this case.”); id. at 
30–31 & n.48. 
 166. See id. at 25–26. 
 167. Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (referring to the Fourteenth Amendment 
fundamental fairness as “a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other 
specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights”), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); Yale Kamisar, How Much Does It Really Matter Whether Courts Work Within the 
“Clearly Marked” Provisions of the Bill of Rights or with the “Generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 
18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 513, 515–17 (2009) (stating that the “specific” provisions of the 
Bill of Rights are not as clear as judges purport them to be). 
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civil cases.168 Rather, it looked more broadly and normatively to proposed 
best practices of contemporary knowledgeable experts.169 This included 
federal executive branch agencies and committees.170 It also cited to 
practices of outlying states that had employed greater youth-focused 
protections than others.171 
It makes sense, therefore, to expand upon this analysis and examine 
these data points as we attempt to further develop a Fourteenth Amendment 
juvenile right-to-counsel doctrine beyond the trial context. Taking such 
evolving standards into account, new juvenile representational rules will 
emerge that evaluate what is fundamentally fair to youth in light of their 
limited capacities, their specific needs, and the nature of proceedings in 
which they may find themselves in conflict with the state. 
C. CONTEMPORARY EXPERT AND STAKEHOLDER RECOMMENDATIONS 
Reminiscent of Gault’s 1960s, intense investigations and interventions 
are taking place across the country today to highlight the shortcomings of 
juvenile-court practices in light of modern standards of decency. As already 
noted, leading scholar–practitioners have documented the ways in which 
young people are often harmed by limited right to representation rules and 
practices.172 Their voices underscore the findings of the National Juvenile 
Defender Center (“NJDC”), one of the nation’s most respected juvenile-
justice organizations, which has shed light on juvenile-court practices that 
are out of step with modern norms.173 NJDC has documented instances 
across the country where youth are not being provided with counsel.174 
Beyond this, its assessments show that even when they are, the culture of 
 
 168. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (“Neither 
do we address what due process requires in an unusually complex case where a defendant ‘can 
fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.’” (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
788 (1973))); cf. id. at 2523 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This is consistent with the conclusion 
that the Due Process Clause does not expand the right to counsel beyond the boundaries set by 
the Sixth Amendment.”).  
 169. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 37–41. 
 170. Id. at 38–39. 
 171. Id. at 37–38, 40–41. 
 172. See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 48, at 795–98; Levick & Desai, supra note 52, at 187; 
Sterling, supra note 55, 660–75. 
 173. See About Us, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER CENTER, http://www.njdc.info/about_us.php (last 
visited May 20, 2014) (“All children [are entitled to] legal representation that is client-
centered, individualized, developmentally and age appropriate, and free of bias . . . .”). 
 174. See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2001), available at http://www.njdc. 
info/pdf/georgia.pdf; MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MISSOURI: JUSTICE 
RATIONED, AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF JUVENILE DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2013), available at http://www.njjn.org/ 
uploads/digital-library/Missouri-Justice-Rationed-Assessment-of-Access-to-Counsel-NJDC-2013.pdf. 
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juvenile court in many places works to impede the work of juvenile-defense 
attorneys and undermine a youth’s ability to receive meaningful advice and 
representation before, during, and after trial.175 
Most recently NJDC studied the state of Missouri, where it discovered 
that approximately 60% of young people negotiate juvenile-court 
proceedings without representation, that court staff often discourage 
attorney representation, and that systemic barriers impede representation 
when it is provided.176 In finding that such practices were fundamentally 
unfair and inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Gault, NJDC offered 
specific recommendations for improvements in the days ahead—
improvements which include an expanded, more holistic juvenile defense 
system that appoints lawyers as early as possible in the process, represents 
youth throughout the proceedings, and better accounts for the 
developmental stage of juveniles.177 
Over the last five years, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
has both helped to fund the expert investigative efforts of NJDC,178 and 
undertaken its own studies and investigations of juvenile-court systems across 
the country.179 DOJ’s work has yielded similar findings and calls for change. 
For instance, it has recently issued reports relating to the practices in two 
different jurisdictions—Meridian County, Mississippi and Memphis, 
Tennessee—which it found to be substandard in light of Gault’s 
fundamental fairness dictates.180 Many of the deemed violations relate to 
inadequate representation for youth throughout the juvenile-court process, 
including in post-disposition probation proceedings.181 In response to these 
 
 175. SCALI ET AL., supra note 174, at 52. 
 176. Id. at 34–38. 
 177. Id. at 55–58. 
 178. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces $6.7 
Million to Improve Legal Defense Services for the Poor (Oct. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-ag-1156.html (describing over $1 million in 
grants awarded to the National Juvenile Defender Center “in order to improve juvenile indigent 
defense across the nation”). 
 179. Rights of Juveniles, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/juveniles.php 
(describing its mission as including the protection of civil “rights of youth involved in the juvenile 
justice and detention systems” and announcing recent investigations of juvenile court systems) (last 
visited May 20, 2014). 
 180. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Releases Investigative 
Findings on the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee (Apr. 26, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crt-540.html; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Investigative Findings Showing Constitutional 
Rights of Children in Mississippi Being Violated (Aug. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crt-993.html; see also Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Announces Investigation of the St. Louis County Family 
Court, (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-crt-
1232.html. 
 181. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE SHELBY COUNTY 
JUVENILE COURT 48 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ 
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findings, Memphis has established an entirely new system for the delivery of 
juvenile-court representation, which is intended to be expansive, 
developmentally appropriate, and holistic in its approaches.182 
Thus, not unlike the reports and studies of bar associations, the 
President’s Crime Commission, and federal Children’s Bureau which served 
as the basis for many of the United States Supreme Court’s findings in 
Gault,183 today’s juvenile justice think tanks and executive agencies are 
providing similar expert analyses and determinations that should help frame 
modern Fourteenth Amendment right-to-counsel norms in juvenile-court 
prosecutions. In fact, the shared concerns of the nation’s leading defenders 
and prosecutors reflect the fact that we are in an historic moment—not 
unlike the moment that inspired the due process revolution of the 1960s. 
D. MODEL STATE PRACTICES IN MODERN AMERICA 
At the time Gault announced a juvenile right to defense counsel at trial, 
many states were already providing such a right. Indeed, the Court looked to 
these states as it determined how a modern juvenile court should operate. 
Similarly, today, a number of jurisdictions already appear to provide more 
expansive representation rights for juveniles than what was expressly set out 
in Gault.184 These rules, which appear to better reflect developmental 
differences between youth and adults, and the differences in adult- and 
juvenile-court proceedings, may further serve to inform a modern 
Fourteenth Amendment framework relating to juvenile-defense counsel.185 
 
shelbycountyjuv_findingsrpt_4-26-12.pdf (“Against the backdrop of a court culture that 
frequently discourages an adversarial testing of facts for children and misinterprets the proper 
role of defense counsel, the Juvenile Defenders in JCMSC are challenged to meet ethical and 
professional obligations to their clients.”). 
 182. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Enters into Agreement to 
Reform the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee (Dec. 18, 2012) available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crt-1511.html (county agreed to 
“[e]stablish a dedicated juvenile defender unit in the public defender’s office that will be 
independent of the court and have the structure and resources to provide independent, ethical, 
and zealous representation for children”); see also Lurene Kelley, Juvenile Defense Reform in Shelby 
County Draws National Attention, MEMPHIS LAW. 6, 6–7 (Nov. 2013), available at 
http://content.yudu.com/Library/A2kv0a/November2013/resources/8.htm (under the DOJ 
agreement, juvenile defenders in Memphis “must be highly specialized attorneys, skilled in 
dealing with families, knowledgeable in brain development and childhood trauma”). 
 183. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38–39 (1967) (citing to the work of the President’s Crime 
Commission and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Children’s Bureau as 
providing persuasive authority for the Court’s determination that representation during a 
juvenile court trial is a constitutional right). 
 184. See Samuel M. Davis, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 284–85 (2d ed. 2013) (describing how 
some jurisdictions have expanded the right to counsel for juveniles beyond what was described 
in specific factual circumstances presented in Gault and Kent).  
 185. See Fedders, supra note 48, at 782 (explaining that Gault failed to fully “consider how 
immaturity and cognitive underdevelopment would affect youths’ ability to exercise their newly 
granted due-process rights” including the right to counsel). 
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For instance, several jurisdictions appear to require appointment of 
juvenile counsel  before formal courtroom presentment. For example, both 
Iowa and Indiana expressly provide that the right to counsel attaches as early 
as pre-charge custodial interrogations—generally seen as an investigative 
stage of the prosecutor’s work and excluded from the Sixth Amendment.186 
Missouri also provides that a child has the right to counsel during the 
informal adjustment interview process.187 Here, too, at least in theory, this 
provides an acknowledgement that a child should benefit from the guiding 
hand of counsel even before formal charges are processed to help a child 
understand the consequences of agreeing to informal probation through 
diversion, and protect the child’s right to silence and against self-
incrimination.188 
As any interrogation would appear to be covered under these more 
expansive rules, it does not appear that the protection of representation is 
limited under these rules to a singular allegation as defined by a singular 
charge under the criminal code. That is, the right that attaches appears to 
be more fluid and expansive than the Sixth Amendment’s “charge-focused” 
or “offense-specific” analysis, which looks to the moment when a particular 
case has moved from the investigative stage to the formal prosecution to 
decide when the right to representation in that particular matter attaches. 
While some states now provide for juvenile-defense representation 
earlier than might be required under the Sixth Amendment, others require 
such representation for a longer period time than that necessarily 
contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. For instance, in Kansas once an 
attorney is appointed, that individual is required to continue to represent 
the child for “all subsequent court hearings.”189 This appears to contemplate 
not only trial and dispositional hearings, but later proceedings such as 
probation review or other post-dispositional matters. In Massachusetts, 
similar practices recently have been developed, resulting in post-
dispositional representation being provided to over 1400 youth since 
 
 186. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (1)(a) (West 2006); Bridges v. State, 299 N.E.2d 
616, 617 (Ind. 1973) (interpreting Gault as requiring “the assistance of counsel at any 
interrogation that may take place” in juvenile proceedings). 
 187. MO. ANN. R. § 113.03(a) (West 1999) (“If the juvenile and the juvenile’s custodian 
appear at the informal adjustment conference without counsel, the juvenile officer shall inform 
them at the commencement of the conference of the right to counsel under Rule 116.01 and 
the right of the juvenile to remain silent.”). Of course, what is on the books and what is 
practiced is sometimes quite different, as suggested in NJDC’s Assessment of Missouri’s Juvenile 
Courts. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 174, at 17. But as drafted Missouri’s Juvenile Court Rule 
113.03 does contemplate an expansive and robust right to representation—even before charges 
have been formally lodged. 
 188. See MO. ANN. R. § 113.03 (a) (West 1999). 
 189. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2306 (b) (West 2008) (“An attorney appointed for a juvenile 
shall continue to represent the juvenile at all subsequent court hearings . . . including appellate 
proceedings, unless relieved by the court upon a showing of good cause. . . .”). 
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October, 2011.190 This extended duration of juvenile representation is 
consistent with best practices as outlined by the National Juvenile Defender 
Center,191 Models for Change,192 and other modern juvenile-justice 
experts.193 
Indeed, rather than adopting the kind of “critical stage” analysis that 
has developed under the Sixth Amendment that myopically hones in on 
particular phases of the process, some state statutory schemes embrace a less 
technical and more holistic view of representation once the right attaches 
for juveniles. Several states considered relatively conservative when it comes 
to the rights of criminal defendants provide more robust representational 
rights for accused youth. Florida,194 Georgia,195 and Louisiana196 all provide 
youth with representation at “all stages” of the juvenile proceeding—without 
modification relating to the kind or significance of the stage. 
E. SOME FURTHER IMPLICATIONS: JUVENILE DEFENSE BEYOND OFFENSE 
Taken together, these authorities suggest at least a rough sketch for the 
way forward as we establish a uniquely juvenile-court-focused Fourteenth 
Amendment framework for the right to, and role of, defense counsel. 
Contrary to concerns expressed in the past, such fundamental-fairness 
representational principles would likely protect vulnerable young people—
in juvenile court’s unique proceedings—even more than their adult 
counterparts. By way of example, this can be seen in the case of a youth who 
has been charged with one crime, appointed counsel, and then becomes a 
person of interest in conjunction with a second crime—unfortunately a 
 
 190. NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ADDRESSING THE LEGAL NEEDS OF YOUTH AFTER 
DISPOSITION 2 (2013), available at http://njdc.info/pdf/rcp_innovations/Post_Dispo_-_Inno 
_Brief_2013.pdf. 
 191. NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE STANDARDS 127 (2012) 
available at www.njdc.info/pdf/NationalJuvenileDefenseStandards2013.pdf.  
 192. Strategic Innovations: Efforts to Improve Juvenile Indigent Defense System Policies or Practices, 
MODELS FOR CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/Action-networks/Strategic-
Innovations.html (last visited June 3, 2014) (“Without competent counsel at every stage of the 
legal process, including post-disposition, youth may be deprived of fundamental legal 
protections, and needlessly suffer any number of serious and lifelong consequences attendant 
to juvenile adjudications.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Sandra Simkins, Marty Beyer & Lisa M. Geis, The Harmful Use of Isolation in 
Juvenile Facilities: The Need for Post-Disposition Representation, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2012).  
 194. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 8.165(a) (West 2008 & Supp. 2014) (counsel to be provided “at 
each stage of the proceeding”); see also State v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204, 210 (Fla. 2001) 
(reiterating right to counsel and each stage and enhanced protections against waiver of 
juvenile-defense counsel as compared to criminal defense counsel). 
 195. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6 (b) (West 2007) (right to counsel applies to “all stages of any 
proceedings alleging delinquency”). 
 196. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. Art. 809(a) (2004 & Supp. 2014) (“At every stage of 
proceedings under this Title, the accused child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel at 
state expense.”). 
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scenario that presents itself with some frequency in both juvenile and 
criminal courts. 
Under standard Sixth Amendment principles a child would not 
necessarily have a right to appointed counsel in conjunction with the 
investigation of a second crime.197 Therefore, if adult-criminal court rules 
apply, law enforcement might be permitted to interrogate that youth and 
take other actions in pursuit of charging them in the second case—all 
without conferring with the juvenile-defense attorney who was appointed in 
conjunction with the first charge. 
But as discussed, modern evolving standards demand special concern 
for children as a class based upon the determination that they are less 
developed than adults. Moreover, our courts seek to treat young people as 
individuals, in light of all of their behaviors and needs, when determining 
the best rehabilitative course. Thus, under such a framework—one 
supported by the calls of leading experts for a more meaningful, holistic, 
and age-appropriate representation for youth—the second crime should not 
be carved out as a separate matter for representation purposes.198 Instead, in 
effectively representing the whole child, juvenile-defense counsel should be 
seen as the attorney of record for the subsequent matter so as to preclude 
police interrogation and otherwise defend the child’s interests during the 
processing of that case. Accordingly, counsel’s appointment should be 
thought of as child-specific, rather than charge-specific under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.199 
Since the scope of representation would be assessed in light of the 
needs of a reasonable child in a modern society, there might be further 
implications for the role of juvenile-defense counsel under the Due Process 
Clause. For example, while adult defendants are presumed capable of 
identifying and raising constitutional claims relating to the system in which 
they find themselves, the same cannot be said for youth. Thus, to effectively 
serve as juvenile-defense counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment, such 
attorneys might also be expected to engage in systemic litigation whenever 
necessary to protect their clients as a class. Raising detention center 
 
 197. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177–80 (1991) (holding a defendant’s invocation 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in on proceeding does not constitute a Fifth 
Amendment invocation for all other crimes); see also, e.g., State v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1992) (finding there was no Sixth Amendment violation when police questioned a 
youth, who was awaiting appointment of an attorney for his criminal, because his juvenile 
defense attorney had been an attorney for “a different matter”—the adult certification).  
 198. Thus, not only would the McNeil rule be abrogated for court-involved youth, but Montejo 
would be similarly inapplicable for juveniles. See supra note 90, 200 and accompanying text. 
 199. Cf. Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2009) (suggesting an attorney-client centered Sixth Amendment right in 
the context of adult criminal proceedings, rather than an offense-specific right). 
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conditions200 and disproportionate minority contact concerns201 could easily 
be seen as essential to preserving fundamental fairness for young people in 
conflict with the law—while clearly beyond the scope of Sixth Amendment 
counsel.202 In this way, juvenile-defense counsel would also be charged with 
holding the system accountable. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
On this fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, it is time to rethink 
the future of the right to, and role of, counsel in this country—taking full 
account of Gideon’s unfilled promises and failings. This Essay has specifically 
called for revisiting and re-envisioning the right, and role of, juvenile 
counsel. It suggests that we might return to In re Gault and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to establish a more meaningful and robust conception of 
effective juvenile-court representation, rather than repeatedly looking to 
Gideon and Sixth Amendment doctrine for guidance as has been suggested 
for decades by commentators. 
When leading juvenile-defender groups—and the nation’s top 
prosecutor—both agree that juveniles are not sufficiently represented in our 
courts, we have clearly arrived at another historic moment. These views, as 
was the case during the due process revolution of the 1960’s, should inform 
contemporary fundamental-fairness analyses. Armed with recent findings 
about adolescent development and competence, and in light of the unique 
nature of such proceedings as they have evolved over time, we should 
reconsider lawyer competence within juvenile prosecutions to ensure 
greater justice for court-involved youth. To meaningfully counter the ways in 
which juvenile court actors increasingly encroach upon the lives and futures 
of still-evolving youthful defendants—most of whom are youth of color—the 
right and role of juvenile-defense counsel under the Fourteenth 
Amendment must be similarly rich, responsive, and evolutionary. 
 
 
 200. See, e.g., CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S LAW & POLICY, FACT SHEET: INDEPENDENT MONITORING 
SYSTEMS FOR JUVENILE FACILITIES (2012), available at http://www.cclp.org/documents/ 
Conditions/Fact%20Sheet%20%20Independent%20Monitoring%20Systems%20for%20Juven
ile%20Facilities.pdf (recommending independent monitors for juvenile detention centers to 
prevent neglect and abuse, and highlighting the Public Defender Service for the District of 
Columbia as a model program serving in such a role for its clients); Sandra Simkins, Marty 
Beyer & Lisa M. Geis, supra note 192 (urging defenders to represent youth throughout 
disposition so that conditions of confinement issues can be discovered and addressed).  
 201. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 59; Moriarty, supra note 59; see also OFFICE OF THE 
JUVENILE DEFENDER, ADDRESSING DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT (DMC) IN JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY COURT (2011), available at http://www.ncids.org/JuvenileDefender/Guides/ 
AddressingMinorityContact.pdf (instructing North Carolina juvenile defenders to engage in 
zealous advocacy around the issue of disproportionate minority representation). 
 202. I seek to further explore this component of an expanded role for juvenile-defense 
counsel, including proposing special next friend standing rules, in a work in progress currently 
entitled: (Im)mobilizing Youth.  
